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Article 7

Judicial Activism in
Prison Reform

Claude Pepper*

A fresh current of concern about the long-neglected rights of prisoners has
begun to flow through the court system of our country. Until recently,
courts almost uniformly refused to have much to do with the criminal defendants who crowded their dockets after they had their day in court and
had been sentenced. Once the prison door was closed, most courts felt
their responsibility toward the convict had ended. They agreed with the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals when it stated in Platek v. Aderhold:'
The prison system of the United States is under the control of
the Attorney-General and Superintendent of Prisons, and not of
the District Courts. The court has no power to interfere with the
2
conduct of the prison or its discipline ....
The prisoner had few if any rights. A prisoner, according to an 1871
opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, was less than a person.
'3
He was nothing more than "the slave of the State."
* A.B., University of Alabama, 1921; LL.B., Harvard University, 1924; United
States Representative from the l1th District of Florida; Chairman, Select Committee on
Crime.
1. 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934).
2. Id. at 175. Platek was not an unusual response. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970);
Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965); Carter v. United States, 333 F.2d 354
(10th Cir. 1964); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955); Powell v. Hunter,
172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949).
3. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). While more
recent decisions are not clothed in such blunt language, the net result is often the same;
Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845, 846 (10th Cir. 1964) (where prisoner challenged
warden's right to impose solitary confinement for an alleged attempted escape: "The
discretion of the prison officials on matters purely of discipline, within their powers, is
not open to review.") See also, People v. Rxiisell, 245 Ill. *268, 91 N.E. 1075, 1076
(1910):
There follows from the judgment a loss of civil rights, which practically deprives the convict of his citizenship unless restored thereto by a pardon.
There remain to him . . . only his mere personal rights, by virtue of which his
life, his liberty, and his property are protected from deprivation. He has
become an alien in his own country. . ..
See 110 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 985 (1961-62).
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This lack of concern marked a serious abdication of responsibility by the
agencies that could and should have been prime movers for reform in the
correctional system. Prisoners are, after all, instruments of the court. In
sentencing a defendant, the judge is, theoretically, removing the convict
from society for a period not only to effect punishment but, even more importantly, to reform the offender so that he can return to society as a useful
citizen who will not return to criminal ways.
An examination of the most recent annual criminal statistics compiled by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation clearly shows that the prison system is
a failure. Of the 37,884 offenders arrested on federal charges in 1970,
4
25,909, or 68 percent, had previously been arrested on a criminal charge.
These statistics show that these offenders had criminal records spanning an
average of five years and five months from the first to the last arrest, but,
in that period, had been arrested an average of four times each for a total
of 158,000 charges. Prior convictions of the federal offenders arrested in
1970 totalled 52,936 with 22,240 imprisonments of six months or more
during their crime careers." The F.B.I. Report emphasized that these figures were a conservative estimate of the national recidivism rate since it is
based upon police detection, arrest, and submission of a fingerprint card.
Since most crimes are not solved by law enforcement agencies and since the
submission of data is often erratic, the rate of recidivism is probably considerably understated by this report.
It is the thesis of this article that criminal recidivism is our number one
crime problem: prisons, rather than reforming inmates, are actually breeding
grounds for further and more serious criminal careers, and courts have a prime
responsibility to oversee and correct the abuses in our prisons. Crime should
be punished, but the corrections process must be just and sensitive to the
rights of its inmates lest their respect for the system by further diminished
and the resulting hostility lead to further crimes. This article will examine
several recent federal cases which reflect an encouraging trend toward realization by courts that reform of the correctional system must begin with the
recognition that prisoners are human beings with rights that must be protected
even during incarceration.
I.,

In Johnson v. Avery," the Supreme Court demonstrated an increased
awareness of the prisoners' right of access to the courts and probably stimu4. 1970
5. Id.

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES

6. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).

37.
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lated greater numbers of prisoner petitions to require courts to assert their
authority against abuse of prisoners' rights. The Court held that, unless a
state provides a reasonably adequate alternative, it may not prohibit inmates from helping others to prepare post-conviction petitions.7 By barring inmates from assisting others in the preparation of writs or in other
legal matters while providing no system of assistance by public defenders
or others, the state was denying prisoners, particularly the indigent, the
federal right of habeas corpus and
[s]ince the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully
incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access
of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed. 8
The Court discerned a procedural inequity in the judicial supervision and
control of prison conditions in that the initial burden for relief was placed
on the prisoner himself, since counsel is usually appointed only after a postconviction relief petition has been initially evaluated and a determination
made that issues raised require further examination in an evidentiary hearing. When the prisoner is indigent and no independent system of free legal
assistance exists, his claim will never be heard unless he is able to find help
from "writ writers" within the prison itself.
It was particularly significant that the only dissenters, Justices White and
Black, did not disagree with the need for legal assistance for prisoners but
merely the means for effecting such relief.9 They argued that, by protecting
"jailhouse lawyers," the Court could be impairing the prisoner's rights since
low quality petitions, drafted by amateurs concerned more often than not
solely with personal profit and power, would usually result. The dissenters
would go further than the Court and would
not in effect . . . sanction and encourage spontaneous jailhouse
lawyer systems but . . . decide the matter directly in the case of a
man who himself needs help and in that case . . . rule that the

State must provide access to the Courts by ensuring that those
who cannot help themselves have reasonably adequate assistance
in preparing post-conviction papers. 10
7. The petitioner, a state prisoner who had prepared petitions for post conviction
relief for other prisoners, had been placed in solitary confinement and denied certain
privileges for this assistance. For a fine treatment of the constitutionality of statutes in
relation to treatment and discipline of convicts, see 50 A.L.R. 104.
8. 393 U.S. at 485. See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (state may
not validly make habeas corpus writ available only to those prisoners who can pay the
filing fee).
9. See 393 U.S. at 498.
10. Id. at 501-02. Justices White and Black address their concern to the reality that:
.. . the jailhouse lawyer often succeeds in establishing his own power structure, quite apart from the formal system of warden, guards, and trusties
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The rationale of Johnson was recently affirmed in a cursory per curiam
opinion, Younger v. Gilmore." That case upheld a district court decision
to the effect that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires California to make available enough legal research material to indigent prisoners to insure access to courts and knowledge equal to that of
12
more affluent prisoners.
The Johnson decision has also, in the past year, prompted one court to
3
carefully evaluate the system of legal relief available to state prisoners.'
Texas attempted to provide an alternative to jailhouse lawyers by hiring a
full-time lawyer and several law students to assist the 12,000 inmates in
the state's prison system. Some access was also provided to law books and
a small law library was created. A class action was brought by several
prisoners to challenge a rule under which they were severely punished for
assisting in the preparation of legal papers. In Novak v. Beto, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the state had not
shown its alternative legal aid program to be adequate and struck down the
prisoner-assistance rule without prejudice to the right of Texas to later demonstrate that their program had been sufficiently augmented.' 4 Cases such
as these will likely improve the quality of legal assistance available to prisoners and, through better documentation of abuses within the prison system,
lead to a greater degree of supervision and reform of the corrections system
through court action.
Fortunately, the reversal of the hands-off attitude of the courts toward
prisons has even reached to prison discipline-an area where judicial intervention has been particularly needed but which has uniformly been considered an executive function beyond the consideration of the courts except
in the most extreme cases of administrative abuse. 15 In Sostre v. Rockefelwhich the prison seeks to maintain.
Id. at 500.
11. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
12. For the lower court opinion, see Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D.Cal.
1970). Citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the district court
posited that:
The right under the equal protection clause of the indigent and uneducated
prisoner to the tools necessary to receive adequate hearing in the courts has
received special reinforcement by the federal courts in recent decades.
319 F. Supp. at 109.
13. Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), rehearing en banc denied, 456
F.2d 1303 (1972).
14. The Circuit maintained that

"...

Johnson v. Avery places the burden of

justifying its regulation against inmate legal assistance on the State ...
at 664.
15. See note 2 supra.

"

453 F.2d
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ler, 6 a New York federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered the constitutional rights of a state prisoner
subject to summary punishment for alleged misconduct.
When Martin Sostre, an out-spoken Black Muslim, accomplished "jailhouse lawyer," and former inmate, was sentenced on March 18, 1968 to a
lengthy term in the New York prison system, he probably returned to jail
with the knowledge that he would be received with hostility. The state
reacted predictably to this known "trouble-maker" by initially secluding him
overnight in the now famous Attica prison and then transferring him
summarily to Green Haven Prison where he was held in solitary confinement
for several days. His release into the general prison population lasted only
a few months, and he was then returned to solitary confinement (defined
by the prison as "punitive segregation") for over one year because of his
refusal to discontinue rendering legal advice and assistance (including the
lending of legal materials to other inmates), a statement in a letter that he
would "be out soon," and his refusal to answer questions about the Republic of New Africa, an organization he mentioned in a letter to his attorney. 17
Except for a period of four months in which he had a cellmate, Sostre was
kept isolated from the other prisoners, placed on a restricted diet, allowed
shaving and showering privileges with hot water only once a week, denied
124 1/3 days of "good time credit" while so confined, refused permission to work, and denied privileges available to other prisoners such as access to the prison library, television and movie rights, and participation in
educational or training programs.
All these disciplinary actions were summary in nature. No administrative
hearing was held prior to punitive confinement to determine guilt or innocence; no written notice of the charges against him was given to the prisoner.
Conversations with the warden regarding his conduct were not recorded.
Nor has any record kept of the warden's decision to punish him. Hence,
the reviewing courts had no written statements for determining the reasons
for Sostre's punishment nor the findings upon which it was based. 18
After one year of confinement, the prisoner filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking injunctive relief and damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,19 claiming that his
confinement violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments and that failure
16. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.

442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
17. 312 F. Supp. at 867-69.
18. Id. at 868.
19. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1970).

1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, mod. in part,
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to hold an administrative hearing prior to punishment constituted a denial of
liberty contrary to fourteenth amendment due process requirements.
A temporary restraining order resulting in Sostre's release from solitary
confinement was followed by a district court opinion, which was probably
the most far-reaching and unequivocal declaration ever made of prisoner's
rights and of judicial enforcement of those rights made to that time. The
decision held his "punitive segregation," without notice or a hearing before
an impartial official at which he could be represented by counsel and crossexamine his accusers, had violated Sostre's constitutional rights; 20 further,
that no written record had been kept of the hearings containing the supporting reasons and evidence was in violation of fourteenth amendment due
process requirements. 21 Numerous other violations of the plaintiff's civil
rights were found, including: punishment disproportionate to the gravity of
the offenses, the imposition of unconstitutional forms of restraint and conditions, punishment for political and religious expression, the right of free
access to the courts and, through censorship of his mail, effective assistance
of counsel. The opinion marked a firm and comprehensive statement of
the protective procedures that must be followed before a prisoner can be
subjected to serious punishment by prison officials. Finding that his confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the district court became the first federal court to award monetary damages of a compensatory
and punitive nature to an inmate of a state prison for improper disciplinary
actions.
The Second Circuit reversed that portion of the district court's holding
that Sostre's confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. But
the Circuit did find conditions to be egregious enough to warrant payment
of $9,300 compensatory damages ($25 per day for each day in solitary
confinement), though not punitive damages. 22 However, such compensation
could not be collected from the state because of its immunity and could be
collected only against the official who has performed the deeds of misconduct-an impossibility in this case because the warden died after suit was
brought. The reviewing court also narrowed the lower court's ruling that all
trial-type elements of due process requirements which it cited would be
necessary in every prison disciplinary proceeding, but specifically stated that
it was not holding
. . . that discipline in New York prisons may be administered
arbitrarily or capriciously. We would not lightly condone the absence of such basic safeguards against arbitrariness as adequate
20. 312 F. Supp. at 369-70.
21. Id.
22. 442 F.2d at 205, n.52.
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notice, an opportunity for the prisoner to reply to charges lodged
against him, and a reasonable investigation into the relevant
23
facts-at least in cases of substantial discipline.
The court also enjoined prison officials from deleting material from or refusing to mail or give to the prisoner communications between himself and
courts, public officials or agencies, or lawyers regarding his criminal conviction, and complaints related to the administration of the prison in which he
was incarcerated. Finally, prison officials could not punish Sostre for political or religious literature in his possession and had to restore his "good time"
24 ,
credit.
A recent New Jersey federal district court opinion has extended certain
minimal procedural protection to prisoners who are segregated for the sole
purpose of preserving order in the institution. Urbano v. McCorkle25 held
that, in such circumstances, a balancing test must be applied to weigh the
need for swift institutional preservation of order and fairness to the prisoner
and that
. . . before a prisoner is removed from the general population of
an institution and placed in segregation, he should be notified in
writing of the charges and nature of the evidence against him
and be 6given a reasonable opportunity to explain away the accu2
sation.
The court indicated that, in emergency situations, such process could be delayed, but only for a short period. It is interesting to note the court's reliance on the Sostre case.27
In another recent per curiam opinion, 28 the Supreme Court made it considerably easier for state prisoners' grievances to be heard in federal courts.
They held that courts can no longer treat civil rights actions brought by
prisoners on account of intolerable confinement conditions as disguised habeas corpus suits conditioned upon exhaustion of state remedies since such
29
suits are supplementary to state remedies.
This decision brought to an apparent end a long dispute as to whether
New York prisoners complaining of unconstitutional prison conditions have
23. Id. at 203.
24. Id. at 204.
25. 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971).
26. Id. at 168. See also Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated
on other grounds, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Keen v.
Mazurkiewicz, 306 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F.
Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
27. 334 F. Supp. at 167-68.
28. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). See also Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
29. 404 U.S. at 251. The Court relied heavily on Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969).
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a remedy, other than habeas corpus, in the federal courts. A reluctant
Chief Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit in Rodriguez v. McGinnis,30 decided that a state prisoner would no longer have to seek exhaustion of state remedies before requesting civil rights relief in federal courts.
At least until the Supreme Court clarifies its short decision in Wilwording v.
Swenson,3 1 we can expect many more prisoner civil rights suits in our federal
courts.
In Haines v. Kerner,3 2 the Supreme Court indicated its intent to maintain a broad supervisory power over the disciplinary actions of state prisons.
Here, a lower court's summary dismissal of a prisoner's suit to recover civil
rights damages for injuries allegedly suffered was reversed. The lower
court's decision was premised on its belief that the plaintiff's petition did
not show the existence of necessary "exceptional circumstances" which, it
maintained, must be present before a federal court could inquire into the internal operations of state penitentiaries. 33 The plaintiff had been placed in
solitary confinement after hitting another prisoner in the head with a shovel
and claimed that such confinement aggravated a previous foot injury and a
circulatory ailment. The Supreme Court, while not deciding the merits of
the prisoner's allegations, held that a prisoner's petition is subject to "less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," and, applying
these standards, the present case did not show "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."' 34 Therefore, he was allowed the opportunity to present
proof as to the validity of his allegations.
In Sinclair v. Henderson,3 5 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana refused to accede to the petitioner's request that it promulgate
regulations to assure state prisoners of due process in the imposition of punitive segregation since this would be contrary to the role it found traditional
and appropriate to its relationship to the prison system. Despite its use of
the language of the traditional "hands-off" policy, the Court did require
prison officials to meet three basic principles of due process required by the
fourteenth amendment:
1.

There must be rules and regulations officially promulgated by
prison authorities and communicated to the prisoner apprising

30. 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
31. The Supreme Court could restrict Wilwording to limit its effect to states such as
Missouri, where there is no remedy to exhaust with regard to state prisoner-treatment
grievances, and where there is no provision for judicial hearings on this subject.
32. 404 U.S. 519 (1972), rehearing den. 405 U.S. 948 (1972).
33. 427 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1970).
34. 404 U.S. at 520-21, citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
35. 331 F.Supp. 1123 (E.D.La. 1971).
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him of what conduct can subject him to serious discipline,
what penalty he can expect and the procedure by which such
a determination will be made...
2. The prisoner must be given official written notice of the specific charge against him.
3. Before serious punishment (such as punitive segregation) can
be imposed, the prisoner involved must be given a hearing at
which he will have an opportunity to be heard. 6
The court also held that the Angola State Prison policy of allowing prisoners sentenced to death only a fifteen minute period of exercise per day,
and even that only while bathing, constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
7
Regular periods of outdoor exercise were orderedA
The new activist role assumed by the federal courts to prevent abuses of
prisoners' Constitutional rights, particularly violations of due process requirements, rights to counsel, and eighth amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment is probably no more evident than in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia's landmark decision
in Landman v. Royster.8s In a well-documented study of the disciplinary
procedures in the entire Virginia state prison system, the court presented
extensive case histories to demonstrate the many ways in which the system
was unconstitutionally abusive of prisoners' rights. Certain forms of discipline were found to be imposed without meeting the requirements of procedural due process. For example, many disciplinary actions were taken
without use of an impartial tribunal or a hearing in which the prisoner was
represented by a lay adviser. Certain sanctions, such as bread and water
diets, were found to be impermissible. Also, certain prison regulations authorizing punishment for such acts as "agitation," "misbehavior," and "misconduct" were held to be unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void.
The court's order covered the points above and others such as the right of
access to the courts and counsel by way of confidential mail or interviews
in prison, restrictions on the use of force or tear gas against prisoners, and
limitations and controls on forced restraint or nudity of a prisoner. Significantly, it included the means by which its sweeping directives could be enforced and pointed toward a continuing supervisory role by it over the state
system. The defendants were ordered to prepare and file with the court
within fifteen days a list of rules and regulations outlining conduct expected
of each inmate with maximum and minimum punishments for violation of
the rules. Prison officials were required to inform all prisoners of the regu36. Id. at 1129.
37. Id. at 1129-30.
38. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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lations and penalties. The prison officials were ordered to report within
twenty days on any steps taken in compliance with its order. Continuing
supervision was specified by a requirement that a concise report of each future incident in which physical restraints or tear gas is used in connection
with or against any inmate be filed with the court within five days of any
such incident, along with a description of the time period in which such restraints were used and the reason for such use.
The enlightened attitude of the Virginia federal court was also shown by
a more recent Second Circuit decision which cited the Landman decision in
granting injunctive relief to Attica prisoners against repetition of violence by
guards who had inflicted threats and physical abuses against prisoners after
the rebellion of September, 1971.39
II.
Part of the reason that the prison system has deteriorated and prisoners
have been abused is our absence of knowledge of what goes on behind prison
walls. Inmates are often economically deprived and poorly educated, with
little voice in the councils of government. Letters sent from prisons are
often censored and do not receive general attention. Courts are now recognizing that conditions in our prisons should be a matter of general concern
and, like trials, should be given some coverage in our press. While freedom of the press in reporting trials has long been a jealously guarded and
protected first amendment guarantee on the theory that the public has a
right to know how its courts are conducted as a check against abusive conduct by the judiciary, similar rights have not been extended to reporters
who want to write stories on prisons.
In recent cases, the federal courts have been moving to extend the light of
publicity to conditions in our prisons. The First Circuit has held that prisoners have the right to communicate with the press by uncensored mail con40
cerning prison management, treatment of offenders, or personal grievances.
In another case, Washington Post v. Kleindienst,4 1 first amendment rights to
report on prison conditions have been extended to reporters. The Washington Post sought permission to send one of its experienced reporters to interview certain prisoners at Lewisburg and Danbury federal penitentiaries in
connection with a series of articles it was preparing on prison conditions.
They requested permission only to interview certain specified prisoners who
had indicated a willingness to be interviewed and stated they would agree to
39. Gonzalez v. Rockefeller, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971).
40. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
41. - F. Supp. - (D.C., filed April 5, 1972).
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reasonable restrictions on the time and place of their interviews so long as
the interviews were not censored and the conversations overheard by prison
officials. The Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons, Norman A.
Carlson, denied this request on the basis of a Bureau Policy Statement prohibiting any interviews of prisoners under their control regardless of the reason for the request or the status or offense of the prisoner sought to be
4
questioned. 2
The Post was particularly interested in obtaining the interviews because of
reports it had received that several inmates who had led work stoppages
that had been ended without violence were being punished by being placed
in solitary confinement, maced, deprived of medical care, and treated harshly in other respects despite assurances by prison officials that the leaders
would not be punished if the stoppage was ended peacefully. The information had been received from letters to relatives and Congressional sources.
The court concluded that, while there are areas of absolute privacy which
the press cannot invade, no law can deprive prisoners of their right to speech
through communication with the press since conviction "does not automatically deprive prisoners of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. '43 Judge
Gesell's opinion stressed the policy reasons why the public has an interest
in permitting the press access to prisoners as well:
The press can be superficial, overly persistent and sometimes
lacking in objectivity, but nonetheless the need to grant substantial
press access to prisoners is readily apparent. Prisons are public
institutions. The conduct of these institutions is a matter of public
concern. Whenever people are incarcerated, whether it be a prison, an insane asylum, or an institution such as those for the senile
and retarded, opportunity for human indignities and administrative
insensitivity exists. Those thus deprived of freedom live out of
the public's view. It is largely only through the media that a failure
in a particular institution to adhere to minimum standards of human
dignity can be exposed. .... 44
The court recognized that the Bureau of Prisons had opened the prisons
to press inspection without prisoner interviews and had permitted confidential mail communication between prisoners and the press. Among the policy
reasons cited for restricting interviews were the "considerations of administrative convenience and possible disciplinary or other difficulties which undue press attention to particular inmates may engender. ' 45 Nevertheless,
the court found the interview prohibition to be "too all-inclusive" and held
42.
43.
44.
45.

Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 1220.1A, Feb. 11, 1972.
Id. at 4 (advance mimeo opinion).
Id.
Id. at 5.
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that individual interviews should not be denied unless a clear threat of administrative or disciplinary problems could be shown to exist. Holding that
the blanket denial of interviews violated the first amendment, the court ordered the Bureau to draw its regulations more precisely to prohibit interviews "only where it can be clearly established that serious administrative or
disciplinary problems are being created." 46 The Post interview requests
were denied because the court found that, after its complaint had been filed,
the Bureau of Prisons had made a reasonable compromise offer for group
interviews without supervision or censorship under certain time and place
restrictions.
III.
All of the decisions discussed in this article reflect a healthy new concern
for the condition of our prisons and a realization that today's mistreated
prisoner may become tomorrow's criminal. I conclude with an observation
made in the Washington Post decision and the hope that the trend envisioned, which is reflected by these decisions, continues. The court wrote:
The quality of a society may be measured by the manner in
which it treats its criminal offenders. There is now, fortunately,
a growing concern in this area expressed by the Executive, the
Courts, and the bar. Much wider press
interest and more general
47
public concern should be encouraged.

46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 8.

